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Introduction
F
IFTY YEARS AGO, the philosopher Martin Buber (1947) de-
ﬁned the kibbutz experiment as an “exemplary non-failure,”
(not as an exemplary success). Half a century later, many from within and
without the kibbutz society talk about the kibbutz experience as a possible
failure. Why? What went wrong?
As Martin Buber’s forte was dialogue between “thou and I,” it is appro-
priate to start by telling you of a dialogue I had about three years ago with
my youngest son who, at that time (his last year at high school) was work-
ing on his ﬁnal paper. His ﬁeld research for the paper focussed on the
structural changes adopted in kibbutzim in the domains of principles for
distributive justice (and expressions of collectivism/individualism, equality,
and solidarity), how they affected the formation of values, and their inter-
nalization among high-school students in kibbutzim. The ﬁndings showed
many students reporting their parents’ wishes to transform the kibbutz-
guiding values of equality, collectivism, and solidarity into those prevailing
in the outside world: i.e., individualism, equity, and nonsolidarity.
We talked at length about the ﬁndings. One of the questions he asked,
in a typical teenager’s direct way, was: “Why are the parents so stupid?
Why do kibbutz members give way on what is ‘right’ (meaning ‘good’) and
‘successful’ (his words)? Why do these parents want to become like every-
one else in the cities around them, when they can be unique and outstand-
ing in their lives?” This paper is part of the response I offered my son.
I have to begin by clarifying what he, and now I, mean by a “right”
and a “successful” society. Since being “right” is a matter of one’s values
and choice, I need to state what I believe makes for a “right” or “good”
community.The “Right” and “Good” Community
F
IRST, THE DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS of such a com-
munity should be viewed from the perspective of both its indi-
vidual members and society as a whole (society being deﬁned as a com-
munity where members interact with each other).
Second, the expectation from the individual perspective is for the com-
munity to relate to each member as a unique person; to satisfy all its mem-
bers needs; to offer them opportunities for the realization of their poten-
tial; to present them with the opportunity to determine and control the
fate and destination of their own and their community’s life; and to ensure
that members have freedom of choice in all important matters.
Third, the societal perspective demands a community where the rela-
tionships among its members are structured on principles of equality ac-
cording to their unique needs and potential, on intensive collaboration,
unconditional solidarity, co-operation, and fraternity.
In addition, there is another societal perspective central to such a com-
munity: the active dissemination by the community of the values enumer-
ated above. The “rightness” of such a community is enhanced when the
implementation of these values extends outside its boundaries to include
other parts of the larger society—creating opportunities and freedom of
choice for individuals who are not members of the community; spreading
social justice, equality, solidarity, co-operation, and lack of conﬂict as
widely as possible in the society that engulfs the community in focus.
Thus, the extreme manifestation of a “right” or “good” community is
one in which all members are able to satisfy all their needs in a sustainable
way (i.e., for the present, the near future, and the distant future), maximiz-
ing the expression of their human potential and living in solidarity, in col-
laboration, and in co-operation in a community of equality among mem-
bers. In addition, the community actively invests in spreading these char-
acteristics into the larger society.
2C ENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF CO-OPERATIVESThe above statements also deﬁne what type of society such a commu-
nity could not be. It could not be a society where the guiding principle of
conduct is the market principle, since solidarity, co-operation, and collabo-
ration conﬂict with market principles. Nor could it be a society based on
principles of hierarchy, since the latter conﬂicts with the goal of equality
and the opportunities offered to all members to take part equally in shap-
ing their lives, to satisfy their needs, and to express their human potential.
Only a “communal” society satisﬁes the criteria stated above.
If one takes the criteria that deﬁne a “right” community, a “good” com-
munity, and tests them against the normative guiding principles of kibbutz
society and its communities, one ﬁnds them to ﬁt quite well. Kibbutz law
(Takanot Hakibbutz 1973), for instance, in its preface of goals and assump-
tions states the following:
The kibbutz is a free association of people for the purpose of the
… existence of a communal society based on principles of public
ownership of property, … equality and participation in all domains
of production, consumption and education. The kibbutz … sees
itself as a leader of the [Israeli] national insurrection and aims at
establishing in Israel a Socialist society based on principles of eco-
nomic and social equality.
[In addition] Kibbutz goals [among others] are:
1. To develop and promote friendship and fraternity among its
members.
2. To develop and promote members’ personalities, personal
abilities, and collective ability in the spheres of economy,
society, culture, science, and art.
Many other kibbutz documents and resolutions throughout the years
show that these foundations and goals served as guidance for the social,
economic, educational, and political actions kibbutzim and the kibbutz
movement performed over the years.
Kibbutzim, therefore, aimed to become “right” communities. Were
they successful in doing so? Were they also successful in the sense that im-
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side society judged on standards that make for a sustainable society?
Examination of the following ﬁve basic indicators will show that until
the beginning of the nineties, kibbutz society was—relative to the rest of
society in Israel—very successful:
1. the extent of adherence to the values and principles identiﬁed
earlier;
2. the extent of members’ satisfaction with, and commitment to,
kibbutz life;
3. life expectancy of kibbutz population;
4. economic performance of kibbutz industry; and
5. demographic growth.
Adherence to Aspired Principles and Values
This has been manifested in many domains: through equality in
decision making by the institutions of direct democracy as expressed in the
general assembly, managerial rotation, and the decentralization of inﬂu-
ence through elected committees; through equality in consumption based
on the principle “to each according to his/her needs”; through structuring
industrial management on the same principles; and through devoting re-
sources (money and human) to the education of the needy in Israel and to
political and community action in the country.
Trust in, Satisfaction with, and Commitment to,
Kibbutz Life
These qualities are most important for voluntary communities as
their future depends on them. In the past, such commitment was very
strong; it was not an unusual ﬁnding to record 70–90 percent of members
stating they have such positive attitudes (e.g., Rosner et al. 1990).
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Longevity as a characteristic of a society can be regarded as an ex-
pression of the quality of life in that society. Life expectancy of the kibbutz
population was shown to be among the highest in the world.
Table 1: Life expectancy (LE) at birth and at age ﬁfty of kibbutz permanent population
and Israeli Jews* in three years—1977, 1984, and 1995 (by gender)
LE at Birth LE at Age Fifty
Gender Year Kibbutz Israeli Jews Kibbutz Israeli Jews
1977 74.4 71.9 28.3 25.7
Males 1984 76.7 73.5 29.6 26.5
1995 78.1 75.9 30.8 28.3
1977 79 75.4 31 28
Females 1984 81.3 77.1 33.4 29.2
1995 82.5 79.8 33.8 31.2
* Sources: Leviatan 1999; data for the Jewish population in Israel are taken from the
Statistical Abstracts of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, 1979, 1986, 1997.
As the table shows, kibbutz LE surpasses that of the general Jewish pop-
ulation of Israel by three to four years in all three comparisons. Because the
average increase in LE is about three to four months per year, this means
that the Jewish population of Israel will reach the current LE of the kibbutz
population in about ten to twelve years hence. Important for the discus-
sion is the fact that research shows higher LE in kibbutzim results not be-
cause of self-selection or genetic advantage, but because of certain social
arrangements for the aged (Leviatan et al. 1986; Leviatan 1999). These so-
cial arrangements stem from adherence to the same values and principles
that deﬁne the kibbutz phenomenon: solidarity, equality according to
needs and abilities, co-operation, and relating to each individual as a
unique person.
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Demographic growth is usually a sign of success for communities,
particularly for voluntary communities such as the kibbutzim, as it is also
a strong indicator for organizational commitment. During the years 1970–
1985, the kibbutz population grew by an annual rate of more that 2.5 per-
cent, outdoing the rate of growth in Israeli society. The growth of kibbutz
population continued to the end of the 1980s, reaching a peak of 129,000 in
1991. The trend changed its direction in the 1990s. This will be discussed
later.
Figure 1: Kibbutz Population (1970–2000)
Source: Pavin 2001.
Again, research at the time showed that the commitment of kibbutz
members to kibbutz life was primarily affected by the extent to which their
communities exercised and realized the unique social values identiﬁed
above as characteristics of the “right” community—judged from the indi-
vidual perspective, the societal perspective, and also by the extent to which
the community aimed its actions towards the outside world (e.g., Rosner et
al. 1990; Leviatan 1994).
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An appropriate comparative indicator for the economic success of
kibbutzim in relation to the outside society is the level of industrial busi-
ness activity. This is justiﬁed on three accounts. First, kibbutzim started
their industrial revolution only at the end of the 1960s, and were thus new
in the ﬁeld during the seventies and eighties. Any successful showing is
therefore attributable to their activity at that time and not to an accumula-
tion of resources such as capital, know-how, or technology from previous
times. Second, industrial activity, for the last twenty years, accounts for
about two-thirds of kibbutzim income. And third, the objective character-
istics of industry make it more easily comparable to its counterparts out-
side the kibbutz than other kibbutz economic activities such as farming or
services.
Indicators of economic success from the mid-seventies to the end of
the eighties show kibbutz industry exceeding values for comparable indus-
try in Israel (see ﬁgures 2 and 3, overleaf, showing labour productivity and
rate of growth). Kibbutz labour productivity over the ﬁfteen years 1976–
1990 was, on average, higher than Israeli industry by 17 percent. While the
rate of growth in sales in both communities was about equal during the
ﬁrst few years of the same period, kibbutz industry surpassed that of Israel
during the 1980s. Again, things change for the worse in the 1990s, as will be
explained below.
Research has demonstrated that industrial success on the kibbutz came
about because of adherence to the same principles that deﬁne the commu-
nity. Industrial plants that emphasized worker participation in decision
making, equality, individual unique attributes, teamwork, and managerial
rotation did better than those that did not adhere to these principles (e.g.,
Leviatan and Rosner 1980).
Changes in the Late Eighties and Nineties
I
N THE MID-1980S, Israel was in a dire economic situation,
with an inﬂation rate of more than 400 percent and very high
unemployment. Kibbutzim were also affected. The government program
UNIVERSITY OF SASKATCHEWAN 7
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Figure 2: Yearly sales per worker: ratio Kibbutz/Israel (Israel = 100)
Source: Leviatan 2001.






















































Kibbutz IsraelUNIVERSITY OF SASKATCHEWAN 9
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intended to deal with this difficult economic situation focussed on control-
ling inﬂation by freezing prices, wages, and interest rates—a program that
effectively curbed inﬂation but increased unemployment even further. For
a period of time, real interest rates rose to more than 80 percent. All major
banks in Israel at the time were nationalized after going through bank-
ruptcy several years earlier, meaning that the high interest rate was the re-
sponsibility of the government. Kibbutz communities could not tolerate
unemployment—for them it was the equivalent of disintegration—and
were, therefore (as before), intensive users of the expensive investment and
working capital. As a result, most of the kibbutzim, which were prior to
that time debt free, went heavily into debt.
The debate rages to this day as to where and to what degree among the
parties—the kibbutzim, the government, and the banks—one should put
the blame for this situation. The banks and the government agreed, almost
a decade later, to forgo about two-thirds of the debt due to the excessive
interest rates levied on the kibbutzim. The practical outcome of the econo-
mic crisis, nevertheless, was that many kibbutzim found themselves in an
extremely unpleasant economic situation. This in itself was not historically
unique. A similar situation occurred at the beginning of the sixties, and the
kibbutzim came out of it even stronger than before. Unfortunately, that
was not the case with this last economic crisis. It soon became clear that
the economic situation was only a cover for a much deeper problem: an
ideological crisis that was manifested in many ways.
Doubt was cast on the feasibility of kibbutz organization and manage-
ment as an appropriate system to compete in the market economy; mis-
trust in the survival of kibbutzim started to grow; and the basic values of
equality, partnership, solidarity, and co-operation became unacceptable to
an increasing segment of kibbutz membership. The slogan thrown into the
air was: “Our way of life has failed; we need to change and be like everyone
else.”
As a result, starting at the end of the 1980s, accelerating during the
1990s, and continuing up to the present, more and more kibbutzim intro-
duced structural changes based on principles and values similar to those

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.traditional kibbutz communities. These were introduced ﬁrst in the busi-
ness domain in the hope of improving its performance, and eventually
were adopted into the social sphere. Within a period of one decade, dra-
matic structural changes had taken place, as may be seen in tables 2 and 3.
As illustrated, in 1999, boards of directors were operative in more than
three-quarters of kibbutzim industries, while only ten years earlier they had
existed in less than one-quarter of them. The rate of hired labor in kibbutz
industries rose in 2000 to 67 percent, more than double the rate a decade
earlier. In 2001, 35 percent of kibbutzim had formed partnerships with pri-
vate capital, compared to 12 percent at the beginning of the decade. And
43 percent of all kibbutzim report doing away with managerial rotation,
while only 8 percent reported this in 1990.
Close to three-quarter of the kibbutzim reported in 2001 that they had
separated their business activities from their community (i.e., they gave up,
among other things, guiding their economic actions with social considera-
tions), while at the beginning of the decade, this structural characteristic
was present in an insigniﬁcant number of kibbutzim (6 percent). In addi-
tion, 60 percent of kibbutzim employ hired (i.e., nonmember) managers,
and the number of top managers in kibbutz industries was (not shown in
the table) about 25 percent (80 out of 360). In 2001, 43 percent of kibbut-
zim paid differential salaries to members according to their office level,
compared to none in the early 1990s.
Structural reforms in the kibbutz social domain were also extensive,
most notably in three areas: public budgets for consumption were priva-
tized, meaning that budgets allocated according to needs were distributed
equally “per member”; democratic institutions were either abolished or had
their power taken away; and remuneration principles were according to
contribution or office. These changes can clearly be seen in table 3 (over-
leaf). In 2001, the food budget was privatized in 72 percent of kibbutzim,
while only 3 percent had that arrangement in 1990. A council of represen-
tatives replaced the general assembly in a quarter of the kibbutzim in 2001,
while it was almost nonexistent in 1990 (1 percent). And differential salaries
were practiced in 43 percent of the kibbutzim in 2001, compared to none in
1990.
UNIVERSITY OF SASKATCHEWAN 11
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Anecdotally, even the language used to describe positions, titles, and
institutions has changed to reﬂect similarity to those outside kibbutzim.
The top office holder in industry, for instance, is no longer the co-ordina-
tor of the business but its general manager or CEO. The industrial commit-
tee has become the board of directors, and its former co-ordinator is now
chairperson of the board of directors. Kibbutz as a descriptor for all do-
mains of life has given way to community, to be distinguished from busi-
ness, which replaced economic sector. The common denominator for all
these structural changes is to strengthen similarities to the outside world
by way of “institutional isomorphism.”
What are the effects of these structural changes to the unique values of
the traditional kibbutz? The board of directors usually takes away decision-
making powers from the workers (also abolishing their general assembly
and its committees), and from other institutions such as the general assem-
bly and various committees on the kibbutz. Industry becomes more hierar-
chical and less democratic or participatory, as the board of directors ap-
points the general manager and makes all important decisions. Added to
this are the hired managers, who report to whomever pays their salaries
(higher management) and not to the assembly of either the kibbutz or in-
dustry. The abolition of managerial rotation further damages democracy,
which was a major countervailing mechanism against hierarchy and in-
equality. The introduction of differential salaries according to office held
erodes signiﬁcantly the principle of equality among members, and the sep-
aration of industry from the community destroys the possibility of indus-
try to be “the extended home for the member” (as one of the previous
resolutions stated).
The Effects of Structural Changes
on the Functioning of Kibbutzim
T
HE STRUCTURAL CHANGES adopted in the social domain
are of two kinds: the privatization of public consumption
budgets (allocated in the past according to needs), which are now allocated
equally per head; and damage to the democratic process by weakening orabolishing the general assembly, as well as many of the elected offices and
committees. All these structural changes were in one direction, and at pres-
ent, about a third of the kibbutzim adopted most of them. Did these struc-
tural changes improve the lot of kibbutzim and their members? We will
explore the same ﬁve criteria for success as were used at the beginning of
this paper.
Adherence to Aspired Principles and Values
Almost by deﬁnition, most of these structural changes distance the
kibbutzim that adopt them from the original basic values of equality, soli-
darity, participation, reference to individual needs, etc. In addition, public
support for adopting unequal principles of remuneration has steadily in-
creased, as may be seen in ﬁgure 4.
Figure 4: Support (%) for differential remuneration, annual surveys (1993–2002)
Source: Palgi and Orchan 2002.
There is a growing trend in the rate of those who support differential
remuneration. In the two separate movements, Artzi and Takam, it has
risen from 23 percent and 34 percent in 1993 (the ﬁrst time this question
14 CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF CO-OPERATIVES





































Artzi Takamappeared in the annual survey of attitudes) to 46 percent and 58 percent in
2002. This means that at least half of the membership is now abandoning
the “axle principle,” to use Bell’s phrase, of kibbutz life: “To each according
to his/her needs, from each according to his/her abilities” (Bell 1962).
Trust in, Satisfaction with, and Commitment to,
Kibbutz Life
As the next two ﬁgures show, if any causal conclusion could be
reached about the effect of the structural reforms on the trust people have
in the future of the kibbutz and the level of satisfaction with their lives
there, it would be a negative one. Apart from one year in each case, the
graphs show a consistent downward trend, with the percentage of those
satisﬁed with their lives on a kibbutz dropping from 64–70 percent in
1989–1990 to 58 percent in 2002. Over the same period, the percentage of
those expressing trust in the future of kibbutz life deteriorated from about
half the sample to a quarter of it.
Figure 5: Percentage of those satisﬁed with kibbutz life (Annual Surveys 1989–2002).
Takam ﬁgures are on the left and artzi on the right of the column pairs.
Source: Palgi and Orchan 2002.
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nFigure 6: Percentage of those expressing trust in kibbutz future (Annual Surveys
1989–2002). Takam ﬁgures are on the left and artzi on the right of the column pairs.
Source: Palgi and Orchan 2002.
Figure 7: Added value of kibbutz industries to their kibbutzim (ﬁxed prices, ratio to 1992)
Source: Leviatan 2001.
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The improvement on economic performance seemed to be the
main motivator for the structural reforms mentioned earlier. However, its
fate was no better than the “softer” indicators: it has experienced constant
deterioration. As seen in ﬁgures 2 and 3, the rate of growth in sales for kib-
butz industry came below that of Israeli industry over the years 1990–1995,
with a further relative decline from 1996 to 2000. The labour productivity
of kibbutz industry (yearly sales per worker) relative to that of Israeli in-
dustry shows a strong downward trend at the beginning of the nineties and
falls below that of Israeli industry from 1993 onward. Figure 7 shows that
same trend from another angle: the added value of kibbutz industry to
their community—i.e., the amount of money transferred to the kibbutz
from industrial activity such as salaries of members, proﬁts, allocation for
depreciation, and payment for services rendered. The year 1992 is used as
the anchor year as it was the ﬁrst year such data was reported. As shown in
ﬁgure 7, the trend is downward.
Demography
The same trend as seen with the other criteria is clearly evident
with demographic data. In strong contrast to the situation before the de-
cade of the nineties, kibbutz population consistently shrank in size from
1992 onward (see data in ﬁgure 1, which shows a decline in population of
about 11 percent—from 129,300 to 115,300—within one decade).
Life Expectancy
On this criteria we have to wait somewhat longer for results.
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Downgrade Kibbutz Function
The Importance of Ideology
O
VERALL, ONE MIGHT WELL WONDER at the downgrad-
ing of kibbutzim on all important indices. In particular, why
the decline in the economic and demographic domains? Weren’t the struc-
tural changes that sacriﬁced unique kibbutz values aimed at improving
these two areas? Although that may have been the aim, it did not work.
Advocates of these changes as a panacea for kibbutz problems would have
known better had they had any theoretical knowledge about communal
and voluntary organizations or communities. The reforms in the social and
business domains should, in fact, have been expected to bring about deteri-
oration in both commitment of members and kibbutz demography, and
also in economic performance.
Here is why. The central factor in attracting membership to such com-
munities or organizations is the extent to which individuals ﬁnd a congru-
ence between their personal values (not the satisfaction of their welfare
needs) and the goals of the organizations. As studies since the 1960s have
demonstrated, this was always true of the attractiveness of kibbutz commu-
nities for their members (Rosner et al. 1990). It was further demonstrated
in research ﬁndings during the last decade, illustrated in ﬁgures 8 and 9.
These ﬁgures show how satisfaction of various needs and the expression of
values by individuals and by their communities explain variance in “com-
mitment in kibbutz life” during two periods: 1991–1996 and 1997–2001.
The two pie representations in the graphs are the results of multiple
regression analyses. Although the studies are some years apart and the sam-
ples are different (different individuals and different kibbutzim), the simi-
larity in the two graphs is striking. The explained variance in both is about
•     LEVIATAN
18 CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF CO-OPERATIVES60 percent; individual values and kibbutz adherence to its unique values
account for about 30 percent; emotional attachment accounts for about 10
percent (“feeling at home and belonging”); self-realization for another 10
percent; and satisfaction of material needs, about 6 percent.
Figure 8: Estimate of explained variance in “commitment to kibbutz life”; about fourteen
kibbutzim; N = 1750; 1997–2001 (Graph begins top right with “community, partnership, soli-
darity” at 18% and reads clockwise.)
Source: Unpublished data of ongoing research.
Note that during these two periods the level of kibbutz adherence to its
unique values deteriorated. The level of members holding to these values
also declined (remember ﬁgure 4, showing the increase in the percentage of
those supporting differential remuneration). Yet, the importance of values
and of value adherence in inﬂuencing commitment did not change. This
means that the satisfaction of individual needs does not replace, in its im-
portance, the effect of values on commitment to human organizations such
as a kibbutz. Abolish values completely from the life of such communities
and you get complete disintegration rather than compensation by other
attractors.
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Figure 9: Estimate of explained variance in “commitment to kibbutz life”; about twenty-
ﬁve kibbutzim; N = 2800; 1991–1996 (Graph begins top right with “community, partnership,
solidarity” at 21% and reads clockwise.)
Source: Unpublished data of ongoing research.
Economic success also could not be achieved by the structural changes
made in the business domain. Many of the new managerial principles pre-
cluded the intensive use of the high-quality kibbutz human resources,
which are characterized by a high level of education (about ﬁfteen years for
the age group twenty to sixty); a high level of management skills due to the
practice of managerial rotation; proven skill as intensive team workers; and
a high level of motivation. This quality of human resources is the only ad-
vantage that kibbutzim have in their economic activities; there are draw-
backs in numbers, in age, in physical ability, in distance from business
centres, and in inﬂexibility of geographic mobility. Throwing out one’s ad-
vantages and relying on one’s drawbacks cannot be considered good busi-
ness management.
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ageon economic success revealed themselves immediately. They will also prob-
ably have a detrimental affect in the future, with the coming waves of po-
tential young kibbutzim members.
It is time now to return to the story of my son’s research paper, which
was expanded, a year later, by one of my students for his thesis. The study
focussed on high-school students from about thirty kibbutzim (grades ten
to twelve) who studied in three kibbutz regional high schools. It also in-
cluded city youth who attended the same schools. A central ﬁnding was
that students’ value expressions regarding equality and solidarity, and their
views on individualism and collectivism, corresponded quite strongly with
the level and intensity with which their kibbutzim had adopted structural
changes in the direction of “privatization of public consumption budgets”
and “implementation of differential remuneration according to office or
contribution.” The longer their kibbutz had adopted these social arrange-
ments, the stronger the students’ support for values expressing individual-
ism, and the weaker their support for equality and solidarity. This strong
relationship appeared independent from the effect parents had on the value
convictions of their sons and daughters.
In ﬁgure 10 (overleaf) we see that students who come from kibbutzim
with the most intensive structural reforms are least supportive of the prin-
ciple of equality in their kibbutz. The difference between the two other
groups is not statistically signiﬁcant. Figure 11 (overleaf), which includes
city youth, reveals the same conclusion: students from kibbutzim that have
experienced the most intensive reforms show the least support for the
equality principle as a guide for the most desirable way of life. They are
even less supportive of this principle than students from the cities who
study in the same kibbutz regional schools, and who are also low in sup-
porting this principle compared to students from kibbutzim with less in-
tensive structural reforms.
When asked about the principles that should govern society at large
(ﬁgure 12, overleaf), the trend is similar: 43–44 percent of the students from
kibbutzim with little or medium structural reform support the principle of
equity (vs. equality), in contrast to the 54–57 percent of city students and
students from kibbutzim with intensive reforms who are in favour of it.
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Figure 10: Extent of support for equality in kibbutz (high-school students from different
types of kibbutzim) (5 = high)
Source: Unpublished data of ongoing research.
Figure 11: Extent of support for principles of equality in a most desired way of life (high-
school students from city and different types of kibbutzim) (5 = high)
Source: Unpublished data of ongoing research.
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Figure 12: Percentage of support for the value of equity (vs. equality) in society at large
(high-school students from different types of kibbutzim, and city students)
Source: Unpublished data of ongoing research.
But young people grow older. Imagine when these youths become
adults and start to contemplate the possibility of becoming members of
kibbutzim. Why would they make such a choice when their value system is
tilted towards individualism, away from a belief in equality, and opposed
to solidarity? Concerning their attractiveness to their own youth, it is likely
that the future is bleak for the changed kibbutz, even if these young people
regain the kibbutz values of equality, collectivism, and solidarity.
It is interesting how the young people perceive their parents’ views on
different topics (see table 4, overleaf), and the percentage of youth who re-
port no knowledge of their parents’ views at all.
Thirty to forty percent report no knowledge of what their parents
think about topics expressing kibbutz life, while only 15–19 percent say so
about general philosophical and political topics.
Why are the students unaware of their parents’ opinions about life on
the kibbutz, while they do know what their parents think about much
more general topics? Perhaps, in this time of crisis, many parents really
have no clear opinion about kibbutz matters and what values should guide















least change medium change most change city studentstheir operation. Jack Quarter, some twenty years ago, did a small-scale
study of young kibbutz members and high-school students, including their
views on kibbutz and more general philosophical questions (Quarter 1984).
In his summary he suggested that “kibbutz youth are strong on kibbutzism
and weak on socialism.” Applying this to the current topic, it suggests that
such individuals have convictions about equality and solidarity that are at
the concrete level only—i.e., understanding how arrangements should be
applied in kibbutz life. They may not have the more abstract and intellec-
tual convictions (i.e., an understanding of socialism) that would serve as
guides and directives to explain why certain arrangements should be ap-
plied and what changes should be made in times of crisis that will never-
theless preserve the more general values of equality among people, solidar-
ity, and social justice expressed by the philosophy of socialism. Thus, in a
crisis situation, individuals with a strong commitment to equality and col-
lectivism only as deﬁned in their concrete expressions in kibbutz life, and
without an understanding of the more abstract notion of socialism, would
be more inclined to relinquish their commitment to kibbutz life as com-
pared to individuals who are committed to both socialism and kibbutzim.
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Support of Privatization of public budgets 36 38
principles Remuneration according to contribution 36 38
Desired No link: contribution and remuneration 40 40
characteristics Communal ownership of property 36 45
Communal consumption 33 36
Importance of… Material standard of living 18 19
Egalitarian society 15 19
General Personal autonomy 17 18
Improving relations: Jew and Arabs 17 16
Unpublished data of ongoing research.A ﬁnding from a recent study points to such a possibility (Leviatan and
Rosner 2001). The study examined individual convictions on two subjects:
“kibbutz collectivism and solidarity” and “socialism.” The relationship be-
tween the perceived state of the kibbutz in the economic and social realms
was then correlated with the extent of commitment to kibbutz life. This
correlation was calculated for two groups: (a) those for whom commitment
to socialism was relatively stronger than their commitment to kibbutz col-
lectivism and solidarity; and (b) those for whom commitment to kibbutz
collectivism and solidarity was relatively stronger than their commitment
to socialism. The correlation for group (a) was r = .36, while the relation-
ship for group (b) was r = .48 (i.e., 13 percent of the common variance vs.
23 percent of the common variance).
Individuals were also cross-tabulated according to their level of convic-
tion on the same two-value ideas (self-identity as socialist/capitalist and be-
lief in the value of kibbutz collectivism and solidarity). The result of this
cross-tabulation was then correlated with level of commitment to kibbutz
life (see ﬁgure 13).
Figure 13: Commitment to kibbutz life (5 = high) as a function of belief in socialism/capi-
talism and solidarity (communality, equality, solidarity)/no-solidarity
Source: Leviatan and Rosner 2001.
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tAs can be seen, holding the strongest belief in solidarity and equality in
kibbutz life does not guarantee the highest commitment to it. The highest
commitment to kibbutz life is among those who also deﬁne themselves as
socialists rather than capitalists.
As a side note, it should be pointed out that a grain of optimism is in-
troduced by the distribution of individuals into the different combinations
of categories (ﬁgure 14). Forty-three percent view themselves as high on
both socialism and kibbutzism (to use Jack Quarter’s phrase).
Figure 14: Percent of sample (N = 540) belonging to each group (socialist/capitalist; soli-
darity/no-solidarity) (Read graph clockwise beginning with “Socialist Solidarity” at 42.7%.)
Source: Leviatan and Rosner 2001.
This brings me back to the conversation with my son mentioned at the
beginning of this paper. He wondered why members of kibbutzim want to
do away with their life and community. Why do many of them follow the
words of the prophet Isaiah: “… thy destroyers and they that want thee
waste shall go forth of thee”?
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Are the members “stupid”? Of course not. They may look so to my
son’s eye because they did not internalize the importance of building a con-
viction for the more abstract, general values (such as those expressed in so-
cialism) and could not be satisﬁed with the more concrete, down-to-earth
expressions of those values. Forming such belief calls for a major intellec-
tual effort; one cannot rely on life experience alone and on emotional
learning (as it was believed to come about in kibbutz education). Neither
can one rely on “natural” identiﬁcation with such values, since living up to
these values calls for certain sacriﬁces, particularly from those with higher
potential. It is only through intellectual internalization that one accepts
such personal sacriﬁce as a “nonsacriﬁce,” and recognizes altruistic contri-
butions to community achievements as a personal triumph. Without such
intellectual effort, the value basis is weak and will not sustain a crisis sit-
uation.
Members are not stupid, but, as most people, they cannot see into the
future. The detrimental outcomes of the structural changes that are decid-
ed by the members (always democratically) do not come about immedi-
ately, but only after several years—the immediate reaction, in fact, is of
satisfaction with the new arrangements—and by that time it is difficult
for the layperson to make the connection between the outcomes and the
changes.
Members are not stupid but they react, mostly unknowingly, to the
dynamics of a vicious cycle that goes something like this:
The situation is bad; we need to change our way of doing things
and adopt a new direction. The change brings even worse outcomes.
That means we have not changed in a decisive enough way; we need
to make even more drastic changes.
Members, following the changes, do not behave in a collectivistic
way; they do not express solidarity, do not care about equality. Aha!
This is proof that collectivism, solidarity, and equality cannot work.
Let us further distance ourselves from these outdated values….
And so it keeps rolling.
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failure”? While many kibbutzim can be described as non-failures, quite a
few are failures—at least in the eyes of their own members. A lot of mainly
intellectual work will be required to redeem the failures and to prevent the
non-failures from succumbing to damaging structural change. By now it
should be apparent that I believe kibbutz life (as any other communal life)
is based ﬁrst and foremost on intellectual conviction regarding its values. It
cannot survive for many years unless this is constantly nurtured, as human
nature in itself is apparently not inclined to life in such a society.
The Future of Kibbutzim
W
HAT IS TO BE THE FUTURE OF KIBBUTZIM in Israel?
It is said in Israel that since the times of the prophets, pro-
phesy was given only to the fools. As I do not want to be thought a fool, I
will refrain from giving any predictions, but rather will mention brieﬂy
two processes currently at work that may indicate a certain future.
1. Several dozen kibbutzim that decided to strengthen their communal ad-
herence rather than go the way described above have organized a mini-
movement called the “communal stream.” They are attempting to inﬂu-
ence as many kibbutzim as they can from among those as yet undecided
about their future direction. This may eventually lead to a revival of
communal life, particularly since most of the strongest and richest kib-
butzim belong to this group.
2. Young people (my son among them) from the two youth movements
affiliated with the kibbutzim are currently organizing and establishing
kibbutzim where communal life will be very intensive. They see their
mission as work in education and community outside the kibbutz, and
believe that transformation of Israeli society can only come via educa-
tion and socialization of the young. Several hundred young (eighteen-
to-thirty-year-old) men and women are part of this effort, and several
kibbutzim have already been established.
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assuredly Buber’s deﬁnition of “exemplary non-failure.” But they will not
happen by themselves. A lot of dreaming, effort, and energy must be
invested to ensure success.
Summary of Lessons
T
O SUMMARIZE THE MAIN LESSONS from the current
kibbutz experience, lessons that also seem applicable to the
co-operative movement:
1. Adherence to unique deﬁning values is a major holding/attracting force
of social organizations such as the kibbutz.
2. There is a central threat of degeneration from members themselves.
3. Holding communal values is not “natural” as it calls for personal sacri-
ﬁce and altruistic behaviour.
4. Intellectual conviction is central in determining commitment. It is not
enough to be exposed to communal experience.
5. Such intellectual conviction does not transfer in genes across generations
in communal communities.
6. Each generation must be targeted anew for its intellectual and cognitive
socialization into communal values.
7. Social arrangements in such communities determine values formed
among its youth.
8. The pursuance of communal values must be viewed as a goal of such
communities rather than means to other ends.
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